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Lying: A n Augustinian Theology o f  D uplicity , by Paul J. Griffiths. Brazos 
Press, 2004. Pp. 254. $24.99 (paperback).
THOMAS L. CARSON, Loyola University Chicago
Griffiths's book provides an exposition and explanation of Augustine's 
theory about the morality of lying. Although he endorses Augustine's view 
that lying is never morally permissible, Griffiths does not claim to have a 
compelling argument. His aim is to "seduce" the reader to see the attrac­
tiveness of Augustine's view: "This book is argumentative, but it is not an 
argument. It is instead an attempted seduction" (p. 20). The second half of 
the book offers "Augustinian readings" of nine other texts that address the 
morality of lying; these texts include Aquinas's Sum m a Theologiae, Kant's 
"On a Supposed Right to Lie . . . ," and Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lie in 
the Extramoral Sense."
Augustine defines lying as "deliberately duplicitous speech, insincere 
speech that deliberately contradicts what the speaker takes to be true" 
(p. 31).1 According to Augustine's definition, which Griffiths endorses, lies 
need not be false statements nor need they be intended for to deceive any­
one. Augustine's definition is much broader than standard definitions of 
the English word "lying," which include the requirement that the state­
ment is intended to deceive others. Some definitions of lying also include 
the requirement that the statement in question is false. An obvious ques­
tion is whether Augustine's definition is too broad. I am strongly inclined 
to think that a lie must be a false statement and that duplicitous statements 
that are true cannot be lies. However, since many others report conflicting 
intuitions and since at least some dictionary definitions of "lying" do not 
stipulate that a lie must be a false statement, I won't press this point.
Griffiths is well aware of the worry that Augustine's definition is too 
broad. He asks whether it doesn't imply that telling a joke constitutes ly­
ing. He rebuts this objection on the grounds that jokes aren't statements. 
He appeals to examples of jokes that tell stories without purporting to be 
true—"'An Englishman, an Irishman, and a Scotsman went into a pub . . .'" 
(p. 35). This is a good argument as far as it goes, but a wide range of utter­
ances that are intended to be humorous or ironic seem to involve making 
statements that one doesn't believe. I have in mind such things as my wife 
saying of my botched attempt to decorate a cake, "that looks beautiful," 
when we both know that the cake looks awful. Griffiths might be able to 
get around this by denying that such utterances are statements (or asser­
tions), but he would need to give an account of the notion of a statement 
or assertion.
Augustine's very broad definition makes the absolute proscription of 
lying even more difficult to defend than it would be given a narrower 
definition. It is not clear why duplicity that doesn't represent itself as non­
duplicitous and is not intended to deceive anyone is even prim a fa c ie  mor­
ally wrong, much less absolutely wrong.
According to Griffiths, Augustine's view that lying is always wrong will 
strike one as absurd unless one is a Christian. (Griffiths also allows that Au­
gustine's view strikes many or most Christians as absurd.) Griffiths offers 
two distinct arguments in defense of Augustine's absolutism. Augustine's
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(and Griffiths's) background assumptions for these arguments are that: 
speech is a gift from God and that humans were created in the image of a 
triune God.
Griffiths's first argument is that to lie is to reject God's gift of speech and 
misappropriate something that belongs to God.
Lying speech is owned, controlled, taken charge of, characteristically 
and idiosyncratically yours. True speech is disowned, relinquished, 
returned as gift to its giver. . . . To lie is to reject the gift of speech 
by attempted appropriation. To speak truly is to accept the gift of 
speech by adoration. . . . To expropriate, in one of its meanings, is to 
take to oneself by theft what really belongs to someone else. . . . All 
this, in Augustine's understanding, is what you do when you speak 
the lie. You take to yourself and make your own what really belongs 
to God, and you do so out of a misunderstanding of what you are 
and what you take to be your relation to speech. (pp. 85-86)
Griffiths does not formulate plausible moral principles that allow him to 
draw the conclusion that lying is always wrong. It is not clear what consti­
tutes rejecting or misappropriating a gift from God, nor is it clear why do­
ing so is absolutely wrong. The circumstances of human life are such that 
we are often forced to choose between incompatible goods and some goods 
can only be preserved by lying. Suppose that my child's life is a gift (to her 
and me) from God and that the only way I can preserve her life is by lying. 
Here we might say that I am rejecting God's gift of the child by keeping 
my hands clean and refraining from lying rather than lying to save her life. 
Suppose also that our lives and talents are gifts from God. What follows 
from that? Does it follow that failing to develop one's talents to the maxi­
mum and failing to extend one's life as much as possible are always wrong? 
The moral principles that underlie Augustine's and Griffiths's view are un­
clear and far from self-evident. Griffiths needs to speak to these points. It is 
not clear why the proper receipt of the gift of speech and language requires 
that we refrain from lying in all possible circumstances.
Here it seems natural to fall back onto some kind of divine command or 
divine will theory of morality. Augustine might claim that God wills and 
commands that we never lie. One problem for Christians who hold this 
view is that there seem to be passages in the Bible in which the authors of 
the scriptures condone lying. Griffiths gives a strong reply to this objec­
tion and his biblical scholarship is most impressive. But, even if we grant 
him this rebuttal, he has not given strong positive reasons for thinking that 
God disapproves of or forbids all lying. Christians must hold that their 
views about the morality of lying and their commonsense moral beliefs 
are fallible, and should therefore be open to revision in light of gaining 
better knowledge of God's will and purposes. Augustine and Griffiths are 
correct to claim that, given the existence of infinite goods and evils in the 
afterlife, appeals to finite earthly goods sometimes promoted by lying do 
not definitively settle questions about the morality of lying. But even if we 
grant (as I would be prepared to grant) that God's will might conceivably 
justify an absolute prohibition against lying, Griffiths's confidence in di­
vining God's will about lying is seriously misplaced.
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Christians clearly are committed to the love command of the N ew Tes­
tament ("Love your neighbor as yourself") and the golden rule. It is not 
obvious why these principles imply that lying is always wrong no matter 
what, nor is it clear why they don't sometimes imply that one ought to 
lie. Consider a case of lying to an enraged and intoxicated man who is 
about to grievously harm a loved one, an act that he will almost instantly 
regret. The only way to prevent him from doing this is to lie to him. Both 
the golden rule and the love command permit this; I am even inclined to 
think that they require it.
The second and closely related argument that Griffiths repeatedly em­
ploys throughout the book is that the act of lying involves a "performa­
tive contradiction." Speaking with respect to lying and "other attempts to 
reject the divine gift," Griffiths writes:
they are performatively incoherent. That is, they deploy, and thus 
implicitly affirm, something that at the same time they explicitly re­
ject and deny. Speech is a gift given, and a condition of its use is 
that it is received as such. But the lie is a use of speech that rejects 
precisely this condition by attempting, incoherently, to own speech 
as if it had been created from nothing by and for the speaker. This is 
performative contradiction. What issues from it is an act that appears 
to be an act of speech but is really something else, really an absence 
of speech cloaked in words. (p. 93)
I don't understand this or find it the least bit convincing. Sometimes 
people tell altruistic lies that they know to be contrary to their own self­
interest. Such lies do not always "incoherently [attempt] to own speech as 
if it had been created from nothing by and fo r  the speaker [my emphasis]." 
(The reader should examine Griffiths's other statements of his argument 
that lying (always) involves a performative contradiction (see pp. 99, 142, 
and 196).)
Griffiths's Augustinian readings of other texts are digressive and im­
pressionistic but nevertheless quite interesting. These readings are based 
on very impressive scholarship and breadth of knowledge. The Augustin- 
ian readings of Kant and Nietzsche on lying are very well done and the 
latter makes good use of postmodernist sources.
Griffiths is keenly aware of how very counterintuitive his Augustinian 
view is. He writes:
you're the navigator in a warplane carrying a nuclear bomb; you 
know that the pilot has received orders to drop the bomb on a city. .
. . [I]f the bomb is dropped on the city at least a million people will 
be incinerated. The pilot asks you for the coordinates that will get 
him to the drop-site. You think that it would be profoundly wrong 
to drop the bomb on a city . . . and you know that the only safe and 
sure way available to you of preventing this eventuality is to give the 
pilot the wrong coordinates—that is, to speak duplicitously to him.
If you refuse . . . he'll know that something is wrong and will figure 
out a way to get himself to the target without your help. . . . A million 
innocent lives against a lie. (p. 230)
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Griffiths has not seduced this reader. The two main Augustinian argu­
ments he endorses are seriously flawed. Nonetheless, there is much of 
interest and value in this book which I would recommend to anyone with 
an interest in Augustine or the topic of lying. The book displays a remark­
able and very eclectic scholarship and breadth of knowledge. It is gener­
ally very well written, although the lack of an index makes it less useful to 
scholars than it would otherwise be.
NOTE
1. Augustine's definition clearly implies that making a statement that
one believes to be false constitutes telling a lie. It's not clear what he would 
say about cases in which one makes statements that one doesn't believe to be 
either true or false, as is characteristic of bullshit.
Christianity and the Soul o f  the University: Faith as a Foundation fo r  Intellectual 
Community, ed. Douglas V. Henry and Michael D. Beaty. Baker Academic, 
2006. Pp. 192. $24.99 (paperback).
MICHAEL A. CANTRELL, Baylor University
Scottish tartans, as everyone knows, are woven according to a design that 
has been handed down within a Highland clan from time immemorial. 
One can imagine the shock felt by many, then, when historians discovered 
that these designs were actually invented by an enterprising eighteenth- 
century English textile merchant. As the old song warns, what everyone is 
liable to assume "ain't necessarily so." Indeed, all too often, what every­
one believes, nobody really know s.1 Such is the case with the much-touted 
fundamental antagonism between faith and reason. The present deeply 
ingrained notion of a perennial conflict between respectable scholarly in­
quiry and robust Christian commitment was, if not invented, then cer­
tainly popularized only a little more than a century ago by the publica­
tion of Andrew Dickson White's H istory o f  the Conflict Between Science and 
Theology in Christendom  (1896). The contributors to the volume presently 
under review uniformly reject this prejudice of our age; however, rather 
than making it their task to debunk this myth (a task that others have 
ably accomplished), the essays in this volume represent the fruits of a re­
vival of reflection on the positive and constructive role that Christian faith 
can play in informing scholarship, specifically by unifying the life of the 
Christian intellectual community.
Christianity and the Soul o f  the University is the product of a sustained 
conversation that was initiated in connection with a conference of the same 
name, held at Baylor University in March 2004. Noting "the properly com­
munitarian character of the well-formed Christian college or university," 
the editors express the contributors' shared vision that "[i]n the best of cir­
cumstances, church-related higher education instantiates an existentially 
committed way of Christian life in community, grounded in dependence 
on others and on a range of theologically shaped practices and virtues
